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 TRANSGENDER STERILISATION REQUIREMENTS IN EUROPE 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
The possibility of individuals procreating post-transition has long stalked debates on transgender rights. 
In 1972, Sweden became the first European jurisdiction to formally acknowledge preferred gender. 
Under the original Swedish law, applicants for gender recognition were explicitly required to prove an 
incapacity to reproduce – either through natural infertility or through a positive act of sterilisation. 
Across the Council of Europe, 22 countries continue to enforce a sterilisation requirement. When 
considering reforms to their current gender recognition rules as recently as 2015, the Polish executive 
and the Finnish legislature both rejected proposals to remove mandatory infertility provisions. This 
article critiques the rationales for transgender sterilisation in Europe. It places transgender reproduction, 
and non-traditional procreation, in the wider context of European equality and family law. Adopting a 
highly inter-disciplinary framework, the article explores legal, social, medical and moral arguments in 
favour of sterilisation, and exposes the weak intellectual and evidential basis for the current national 
laws. The article ultimately proposes a new departure for Europe’s attitude towards transgender 
parenting, and argues that sterilisation should not be a pre-condition for legal recognition. 
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 INTRODUCTION   
 
 
The possibility of transgender individuals procreating post-transition has long stalked debates on 
transgender rights.1 For many observers, the image of a man giving birth, or a woman producing sperm, 
is so ‘inconceivable’ that, rather than eliciting concern or rejection, it simply creates a sense of farce, 
even ‘absurdity’.2 When Rosenblum, in his call to ‘unsex mothering’, proclaimed that he ‘was, until 
recently, a pregnant man’3, academic colleagues lauded the author’s transgressive intent but were quick 
to emphasise that a pregnancy relationship, properly understood, was not actually in existence. For 
others, however, transgender reproduction represents a more serious, possibly dangerous, shift in 
cultural norms.4 Instead of offering a harmless retreat into anti-reality, the pregnant man and ‘begetting 
woman’ are an existential threat.5 Commenting on public reactions to Thomas Beatie – an American 
                                                          
1 E Parker, ‘Male pregnancy and queer utopia in Paul Magrs’s “Could it be Magic”’ (2014) 28(6) Textual 
Practice 1035; SD More, ‘The Pregnant Man-An Oxymoron?’(1998) 7(3) Journal of Gender Studies 319, 323; P 
Currah, ‘Expecting Bodies: The Pregnant man and Transgender Exclusion from the Employment Non-
Discrimination’ (2008) 36(3 & 4) Women's Studies Quarterly 330, 330.  
2 I Aristarkhova, ‘Man as Hospitable Space: The male pregnancy project’ (2009) 14(4) Performance Research 
25, 27.  
3 D Rosenblum, ‘Unsex Mothering: Toward a New Culture of Parenting’ (2012) 35 Harvard Journal of Law and 
Gender 57, 58.  
4 K Mitu, ‘Transgender Reproductive Choice and Fertility Preservation’ (2016) 18(11) AMA Journal of Ehtics 
1119, 1922-1923.  
5 Emma Parker writes that ‘critics agree that the pregnant man is typically presented as comic or monstrous’. 
Parker (n 1), 1037. Feminist scholars have also criticised the notion of the pregnant man as an attempt to 
misappropriate the female experience of reproduction; see S. Velasco, Male Delivery: Reproduction, 
Effeminacy, and Pregnant Men in Early Modern Spain (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2006) xiii–xiv.  
 transgender man who revealed his pregnancy in 20086 – Currah recalls expressions of ‘disbelief’, 
‘annoyance’ and ‘revulsion’.7 Post-transition reproduction is not only considered abnormal. It is also 
deviant8 and must be avoided wherever possible.  
 
Fear over transgender procreation has had a profound impact on the way European jurisdictions legally 
recognise gender. In 1972, Sweden became the first European country to formally acknowledge 
transgender persons’ preferred identity.9 Under the original Swedish law, applicants for gender 
recognition were explicitly required to prove an incapacity to reproduce – either through natural 
                                                          
6 T Beatie, ‘Labor of Love’ The Advocate 14 March 2008, at < 
http://www.advocate.com/news/2008/03/14/labor-love>.   
7 Currah (n 1), 330.  
8 S B Bergman, The Nearest Exit May be Behind You (Vancouver: Arsenal Pulp, 2009) 145; see also J Landau, 
‘Reproducing and Transgressing Masculinity: A Rhetorical Analysis of Women Interacting with Digital 
Photographs of Thomas Beatie’ (2012) 35(2) Women's Studies in Communication 178, 186.  
9 SFS 1972:119: Lag (1972:119); see also, J Garland, ‘The Legal Status of Transsexual and Transgender 
Persons in Sweden’ in J M Scherpe (eds), The Legal Status of Transsexual and Transgender Persons (London: 
Intersentia, 2015) 281.  
 infertility or through a positive act of sterilisation.10 Across the Council of Europe11, 22 countries12 (out 
of 41 jurisdictions which permit gender recognition) continue to enforce a sterilisation requirement.13 
When considering reforms to their current gender recognition rules as recently as 2015, the Polish 
Executive14 and the Finnish legislature15 rejected proposals to remove mandatory infertility provisions. 
In Ukraine and the Czech Republic, requirements for ‘removal of sexual organs and mammary glands’ 
and the ‘disabling of the reproductive function’ were explicitly enshrined in national law as part of 2011 
and 2014 reforms.16 In France, the Cour de Cassation held, in a 2013 judgment, that the French 
                                                          
10 Ibid. 
11 The Council of Europe is a 47-member grouping of European states, which is dedicated to the protection of 
human rights. Among the members of the Council of Europe are all 28 Member States of the European Union. 
The members of the Council of Europe are also State Parties to the European Convention on Human Rights, 
which is overseen by the European Court of Human Rights. The Council of Europe has a number of political 
institutions, including a Secretary General, Committee of Ministers and Parliamentary Assembly (This 
information was taken from the official website of the Council of European at < 
http://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/who-we-are> accssed 16 April 2017).  
12 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Finland, 
Georgia, Greece, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Russia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine.  
13 Transgender Europe, ‘Trans Rights Europe Index 2016’ TGEU Website 10 May 2016 at < http://tgeu.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/05/trans-map-B-july2016.pdf > accessed 3 November 2016.   
14 Transgender Europe, ‘Polish President Duda vetoes Polish Gender Accordance Act’ TGEU Website 2 October 
2015 at < http://tgeu.org/tgeu-statement-polish-president-duda-vetoes-polish-gender-accordance-act/ > accessed 
3 December 2016. The current Law and Justice Party dominated parliament has refused to reconsider Poland’s 
sterilisation requirement.  
15 Transgender Europe, ‘The Finnish Government should Respect Human Rights of Trans People’ TGEU 
Website 22 October 2015 at < http://tgeu.org/the-finnish-government-should-respect-human-rights-of-trans-
people/ > accessed 3 December 2016.   
16 For Ukraine, see Human Rights Watch, ‘Allegation letter regarding the legal gender recognition procedure in 
Ukraine, as specified in Order No. 60 of the Ministry of Health of Ukraine’ Human Rights Watch Website 27 
 parliament was entitled to impose infertility as part of that country’s gender recognition procedures 
(amended in October 2016).17  
 
  In recent years, the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) has increasingly scrutinised 
transgender sterilisation requirements.18 In its landmark 2017 opinion, AP, Garcon and Nicot v 
France19, the Court held that, by conditioning gender recognition on submission to ‘a sterilisation 
operation or medical treatment creating a high probability of sterilisation’,20 France had violated the 
applicants’ right to private life under Art. 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’).21 
Prior to that decision, a similar conclusion had been reached by national courts in Germany22, Sweden23 
and Italy.24 These judgments are a welcome affirmation of transgender rights, particularly the protection 
of bodily integrity. Yet, as a critical evaluation of Europe’s sterilisation requirements, they provide only 
limited (often superficial) analysis. In particular, both European and national judges have largely failed 
to engage with the justifications which lawmakers offer in support of sterilisation. While the existing 
case law rejects infertility clauses as a disproportionate breach of physical autonomy, it has not 
meaningfully critiqued their rationales. Indeed, statements from the ECtHR,25 as well as the highest 
                                                          
April 2015 at < https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/27/allegation-letter-regarding-legal-gender-recognition-
procedure-ukraine-specified > accessed 3 December 2016. For Czech Republic, see B Hevelkova, ‘The Legal 
Status of Transsexual and Transgender Persons in the Czech Republic’ in Scherpe (n 9), 131.  
17 French Cour de Cassastion, Judgment 10-26.947 (13 February 2013). 
18 YY v Turkey ECtHR 10 March 2015. 
19 ECtHR 6 April 2017. 
20 Ibid, [135].  
21 Ibid.  
22 Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, 1 BvR 3295/07 (11 January 2011). 
23 Stockholm Administrative Court of Appeals, Socialstyrelsen v NN, Mål nr 1968-12 (19 December 2012). 
24 Constitutional Court of Italy, 221/2015 (21 October 2015)    
25 YY (n 18), [41]; AP, Garcon and Nicot (n 19), [132].  
 courts in Germany and Sweden,26 reveal a general assumption that, irrespective of disproportionality, 
transgender sterilisation requirements do pursue valid aims.27 
 
  The failure to properly assess the justifications for sterilisation creates tangible disadvantages for 
Europe’s transgender population, even where sterilisation requirements are ultimately considered to be 
disproportionate. These justifications, and more specifically the cultural and scientific beliefs which 
they reflect, have an influence outside the narrow context of legal gender recognition. Labelling 
transgender individuals as incapable child-carers may not justify sterilisation, but it can legitimise 
national rules which withhold custody or reduce employment rights. To the extent that Europe’s judges 
accept – even implicitly in order to expedite a finding of disproportionality – unproven rationales for 
infertility, they facilitate and encourage wider discrimination against Europe’s transgender population. 
According to Strangio, ‘[i]f we establish in law and social discourse that bodies must be coherently 
sexed to be legitimate, we make spaces for the harassment and violence levied upon those whose bodies 
transgress those expectations’.28 Indeed, both the European Union’s Fundamental Rights Agency (‘EU 
FRA’),29 and the Human Rights Commissioner of the Council of Europe30, have recently documented 
the exponentially higher rates of inequality suffered by transgender communities. Unless judges are 
willing to confront discriminatory rationales for transgender sterilisation, and to acknowledge that 
transgender procreation poses no threat to society, it is unlikely that Europe will be able to reduce the 
current high levels of transphobic abuse.  
                                                          
26 BvR 3295/07 (n 22), NN (n 23).   
27 Ibid.    
28 C Strangio, ‘Can Reproductive Trans Bodies Exist?’ (2015) 19 City University of New York Law Review 
223, 243.  
29 Fundamental Rights Agency of the European Union, Being Trans in the EU – Comparative Analysis of the 
EU LGBT Survey Data (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014).  
30 Human Rights Commissioner of the Council of Europe, Human Rights and Gender Identity – Issue Paper’ 
(Strasbourg: COE, 2009).  
   This article critiques the rationales for transgender sterilisation in Europe. It places transgender 
reproduction, and non-traditional procreation, in the wider context of European equality and 
comparative family law. Adopting a highly inter-disciplinary framework, the article explores legal, 
social, medical and moral arguments in favour of sterilisation, and exposes the weak intellectual and 
evidential basis for the current national laws. The article ultimately proposes a new departure for 
Europe’s attitudes towards transgender parenting, and argues that sterilisation should not be a pre-
condition for legal recognition.  
 
  The article proceeds in five parts. Part I offers a broad overview of the sterilisation requirement. It 
introduces key terms, contextualises the right to gender recognition in Europe, identifies common 
rationales for transgender sterilisation and briefly describes national and supra-national resistance. In 
Parts II-IV, the article shifts to critique the three central arguments which have been raised in support 
of sterilisation requirements: the need for legal certainty (Part II), enforcing child protection (Part III) 
and preserving natural reproduction (Part IV). The article illustrates how each of these claims either 
lacks a sufficient normative or scientific basis, or can be achieved without requiring transgender 
infertility.  
 
  Part II demonstrates that a definitive child-parent relationship is not contingent on transgender 
sterilisation. Transgender procreation is no less legally certain than other non-normative (and even 
normative) reproductive scenarios accepted across Europe. In Part III, the article addresses concerns 
over child welfare and protection. Part III questions whether possible future discrimination, encouraged 
by prejudice, justifiably restricts transgender persons engaging in otherwise unobjectionable 
procreation. Similarly, Part III also explores existing social science research which suggests that, far 
from creating disadvantage, transgender parents are just as capable of raising healthy children as their 
non-transgender counterparts. Finally, moving away from quasi empirical claims towards more 
normative objections, Part IV considers whether transgender procreation constitutes an unnatural, 
socially undesirable reproductive practice. Challenging the proposition that procreative capacities 
naturally determine gender, Part IV argues that women and men are not defined by their ability to bear 
 or beget children. Giving birth should not undermine a transgender man’s legal gender, nor should 
producing sperm affect a transgender female’s status. Finally, in Part V, the article makes concluding 
observations and argues that Europe’s lawmakers, as well national judiciaries, are yet to offer a 
compelling, coherent justification for sterilising applicants for gender recognition.    
 
 
I. THE STERILISATION REQUIREMENT: AN OVERVIEW  
 
A. Transgender Identities and the Right to Legal Gender Recognition  
 
Transgender (hereinafter ‘trans’) is an umbrella term which refers to all individuals whose gender 
identity (one’s internal sense of gender and self) and/or gender expression differs from the legal gender 
that was assigned at birth.31 While there are no definitive statistics for Europe’s trans population, it is 
estimated that as many as 0.60% of people may have a gender variant identity.32 Like the ‘cisgender’ 
population – a term derived from the Latin word ‘cis’ (‘on this side of’) and referring to persons who 
identify with their birth-assigned gender – trans individuals form diverse and varied communities.33 
                                                          
31 See: S Whittle, Respect and Equality: Transsexual and Transgender Rights (London: Routledge, 2002). 
32 A Flores and others, How Many Adults Identify as Transgender in the United States (Los Angeles: UCLA, 
2016) 2 at < http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/research/how-many-adults-identify-as-transgender-in-the-
united-states/> accessed 3 December 2016.   
33 Transgender Equality Network Ireland, ‘Trans Terms’ TENI website at < 
http://www.teni.ie/page.aspx?contentid=139> accessed 3 December 2016. The term ‘cisgender’ is not linked to 
the English language pejorative phrase, ‘sissy’. It is used to illustrate that there is no single (‘normative’) 
experience of gender.  
 There is no single trans narrative or experience.34 While many individuals seek to live in their ‘preferred 
gender’ (‘transition’35) through medical intervention, others prioritise legal and social recognition.36 
Some trans people cannot or will not alter their sex characteristics, including their reproductive 
capacities, but place great importance on private and public affirmation of their preferred identity. Legal 
gender recognition has particular significance for trans populations. Without a passport or birth 
certificate which confirms their lived gender, trans populations may be unable to access basic rights and 
services, including public transportation, postal services and even marriage.37 
 
  The right to legal gender recognition is the product of a decades-long legal fight waged by Europe’s 
trans advocates. Following numerous unsuccessful applications,38 the ECtHR finally acknowledged a 
general entitlement to gender recognition in Goodwin v UK,39 holding that the UK’s failure to offer 
Christine Goodwin an amended birth certificate violated her right to private life under Art. 8 ECHR.40 
The Goodwin case was a landmark moment for trans rights in Europe. The ECtHR’s reasoning was 
subsequently adopted by other global human rights actors, including the UN Human Rights Committee 
                                                          
34 Throughout his memoir, the trans author, Jamison Green, discusses the many and varied ways in which trans 
persons, particularly trans males, express and live a trans identity; J Green, Becoming a Visible Man (Vanderbilt 
University Press, 2004).    
35 ‘Transition’ refers to a process whereby an individual ‘transitions’ to living in their preferred gender. There is 
no ‘standard’ procedure for transitioning. 
36 O Tomchin, ‘Bodies and Bureaucracy: Legal Sex Classification and Marriage-Based Immigration for Trans* 
People’ (2013) 101 California Law Review 813, 843.  
37 United Nations Development Programme, Transgender Health and Human Rights (2013) 21-23.  
38 Rees v UK [1987] 9 EHRR 56; Cossey v UK [1991] 13 EHRR 622; Sheffield and Horsham v UK [1999] 27 
EHRR 163.  
39 Goodwin v United Kingdom [2002] 35 EHRR 18.    
40 Ibid, [93].  
 and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.41 While a minority of outlier European states 
continue to withhold gender recognition,42 most individuals within the Council of Europe can access 
procedures for recognising preferred gender.  
 
  Yet, while Goodwin established a general right to recognition, it allowed individual State Parties to 
determine the precise conditions of access.43 In consequence, different European jurisdictions have 
adopted radically different rules. Twenty-three countries currently require trans persons to dissolve an 
existing marriage before obtaining legal gender recognition.44 Dissolution requirements are intended to 
ease political and social concerns that gender recognition would become a Trojan horse for same-gender 
marriage. There is a general belief that, by ‘[r]ecognising the [preferred] gender of a married person’, 
the law ‘would convert that person’s marriage into a same-sex marriage’.45 Throughout the Council of 
Europe, legal recognition is also generally restricted to those persons who have achieved the age of 
majority. Only five European jurisdictions – Ireland, Sweden, Malta, Norway and the Netherlands – 
acknowledge the preferred gender of individuals under 18 years and, in all five countries, minors 
confront a more onerous or restrictive framework that trans adults.46 In a majority of countries, children 
                                                          
41 UNHRC ‘Concluding observations of the United Nations Human Rights Committee on report of Ireland’ (30 
July 2008) UN Doc CCPR/C/IRL/CO/03, [8], United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
‘Discriminatory laws and practices and acts of violence against individuals based on their sexual orientation and 
gender identity, (17 November 2011) UN Doc No A/HRC/19/41, [84(h)]. 
42 TGEU Index (n 13). The states are San Marino, Cyprus, Andorra, Albania, Lichtenstein and Macedonia.  
43 Goodwin (n 39), [85].  
44 TGEU Index (n 13).  
45 The Equality Authority of Ireland, Observations on the Revised General Scheme of the Gender Recognition 
Bill 2014, (Dublin: Walsh Printers, 2014) 25.   
46 TGEU Index (n 13).  
 are either de jure or de facto excluded from the gender recognition process.47 Express prohibitions are 
enforced in numerous European jurisdictions, including Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Poland, Czech 
Republic and Ukraine.48 
 
  The requirements that trans individuals modify their body are perhaps the best unknown (and most 
widely expected) pre-conditions for gender recognition. In 23 European states, applicants for 
recognition must submit to gender confirming surgeries.49 While there is no standard or uniform surgical 
process, required interventions usually focus on genital alterations, chest modifications and the removal 
of internal organs. Until 2004,50 every European country, which formally acknowledged a person’s 
preferred gender identity, required that the individual be infertile or sterilised. In 2017, 22 countries 
across the Council of Europe (a majority of states that acknowledge preferred gender) continue to 
withhold legal recognition until an applicant proves that he or she cannot reproduce.51 Article 
62bis(3)(2) of the Belgian Civil Code provides that an individual must ‘no longer be capable of 
producing children in accordance with his or her previous gender’. Similarly, in Finland, s. 1 of the 
Transsexuals (Confirmation of Gender) Act requires proof that an applicant ‘has been sterilized or is 
for some other reason incapable of reproducing’. In other jurisdictions, such as Ukraine, sterilisation 
                                                          
47 In Europe, jurisdictions, such as Croatia, Moldova and Switzerland do not explicitly prohibit or restrict 
acknowledging the preferred gender of children. Yet, there is little evidence that trans minors in these countries 
are successfully navigating the recognition process. 
48 TGEU Index (n 13).  
49 Ibid.  
50 In 2004, the United Kingdom enacted the Gender Recognition Act 2004 which specifically omitted a 
requirement that individuals submit to either surgical intervention or sterilisation in order to obtain a Gender 
Recognition Certificate.  
51 TGEU (n 13).  
 forms part of a wider obligation to undergo gender confirming surgeries.52 As noted, s. 29(1) of the new 
Czech Civil Code defines ‘sex change’ surgery to include ‘the disabling of reproductive function’.53  
 
B. Justifications for the Sterilisation Requirement 
 
Europe’s lawmakers and judges have offered no single justification for conditioning gender recognition 
on sterilisation. From the existing case law, policy debates and literature, however, one can identify 
three central justifications – legal certainty, child welfare and natural reproduction – buttressed by two 
initial presumptions.  
 
  First, relying upon what Emens refers to as ‘immutable nature’,54 there is a presumption that that only 
(legal) women are capable of giving birth to children and that (legal) men produce sperm. Describing 
the gender recognition rules enshrined in Art. 40 of Turkey’s Civil Code, Atamer observes the 
unchallenged presumption that, if an individual retains the ability to conceive a child, the law must, as 
a matter of nature, confer a female status upon that person.55 According to Ellis, Wodjnar and Pettinato, 
pregnant men create political and cultural unease because they destabilise ‘social norms that define a 
pregnant person as woman and a gestational parent as mother’.56 Second, there is also a widespread 
                                                          
52 HRW (n 16).   
53 Hevelková (n 16), 131.  
54 Comments of E Emens in D Rosenblum, ‘“A Pregnant Man?” A Conversation’ (2010) 22 Yale Journal of 
Law and Feminism 207, 228.  
55 YM Atamer, ‘The Legal Status of Transsexual and Transgender Persons in Turkey’ in Scherpe (n 9), 317-321.  
56 SA Ellis, DM Wojnar and M Pettinato, ‘Conception, pregnancy, and birth experiences of male and gender 
variant gestational parents: it’s how we could have a family’ (2014) 60(1) Journal of Midwifery Women’s 
Health 62, 64.  
 (unproven) assumption that Europe’s trans population would not want to reproduce.57 While scholars, 
such de Sutter et al58 and Wierckx et al,59 have documented strong reproductive desires among European 
trans communities, there is still a prevailing belief that trans men would suffer distress conceiving a 
child and that trans women would reject producing sperm.60 Indeed, the rights monitoring organisation, 
Human Rights Watch, reports that some European authorities even refuse to accept that an individual 
is trans if they desire to maintain their natural reproductive capacities.61 In the United Kingdom, where 
Parliament omitted a sterilisation clause from the Gender Recognition Act 2004 (‘the 2004 Act’), 
Whittle and Turner recall that Judge Harris, President of the First Gender Recognition Panel, still 
required ‘confirmation that gender reassignment surgery [which would sterilise the individual] had been 
undergone, or at the very least was intended to be undergone’.62 
 
  Within national courts and legislatures, trans procreation is frequently opposed as undermining legal 
certainty. The vista of a man giving birth or a woman begetting children threatens, so the argument 
goes, the ability of Europe’s family law systems to efficiently and coherently function. Nishitani 
                                                          
57 A. Kassam, ‘Breastfeeding as a trans dad: ‘A baby doesn’t know what your pronouns’ The Guardian 20 June 
2016 at < https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/jun/20/transgender-dad-breastfeeding-pregnancy-trevor-
macdonald > accessed 3 December 2016.   
58 P de Sutter and others, ‘The Desire to have Children and the Preservation of Fertility in Transsexual Women: 
A Survey’ (2002) 6(3) The International Journal of Transgenderism at < http://www.iiav.nl/ezines/web/ijt/97-
03/numbers/symposion/ijtvo06no03_02.htm > accessed 3 December 2016.    
59 K. Wierckx and others, ‘Reproductive Wish in Transsexual Men’ (2011) 27(2) Human Reproduction 483.  
60 L. Nixon, ‘The Right to (Trans) Parent: A Reproductive Justice Approach to Reproductive Rights, Fertility 
and Family-Building Issues Facing Transgender People’ (2013-2014) 20 William and Mary Journal of Women 
and Law 73.      
61 HRW (n 16).    
62 S. Whittle and L Turner, ‘“Sex Changes”? Paradigm Shifts in “Sex” and “Gender” Following the Gender 
Recognition Act?' (2007) 12(1) Sociological Research Online at 
http://www.socresonline.org.uk/12/1/whittle.html > accessed 3 December 2016.   
 observes fears that trans procreation can ‘cause confusion and complications to the parentage and family 
order’.63 In defending the necessity of its sterilisation requirement in AP, Garcon and Nicot, the French 
Government argued that the need to guarantee a reliable and coherent civil status in France justified the 
alleged interference with applicants’ bodily integrity rights.64 If mater semper certa est, what is the 
status of a legal male who conceives a child?  
 
  Sterilisation provisions are also promoted as a means of protecting child welfare.65 Summarising 
European debates on gender recognition Kohler, Recher and Ehrt observe a concern that, where trans 
persons are allowed to reproduce, their children will suffer from discrimination and prejudice.66 Just as 
homophobia has been raised in opposition to same-gender adoption, there is a sense that trans parents 
should not subject children to social, economic and legal transphobia. In addition, there are doubts over 
the capacity of trans individuals to fulfil the parental role.67 In 36 jurisdictions across Europe, applicants 
for gender recognition must present a diagnosis of either transsexualism, gender dysphoria or gender 
identity disorder.68  Irrespective of the clinical implications, the diagnosis unequivocally signifies that 
the individual has a mental health concern. Dickey, Ducheny and Ehrbar write that ‘[t]hose opposing 
[trans procreation]…propose that a [trans]identity is inherently pathological and subsequently question 
whether a [trans] person is an appropriate candidate…whereas others question whether [trans] people 
                                                          
63 Y Nishitani, ‘The Legal Status of Transgender and Transsexual Persons in Japan’ in Scherpe (n 9), 378.  
64 AP, Garcon and Nicot (n 19), [105]-[106]. 
65 L. Karaian, ‘Pregnant Men: Repronormativity, Critical Trans Theory and the Re(conceive)ing of Sex and 
Pregnancy in Law’ (2013) 22(2) Social and Legal Studies 211, 222.  
66 R Kohler, A Recher and J Ehrt, Legal Gender Recognition in Europe (Berlin: TGEU, 2013), 62.     
67 Ibid. See also, D Brothers, W C L Ford and the University of Bristol Centre for Reproductive Medicine Ethics 
Advisory Committee, ‘Gender reassignment and assisted reproduction: An ethical analysis’ (2000) 15(4) 737; 
TF Murphy, ‘Commentary: Crossing Cultural Divides: Transgender People Who Want to Have Children’ 
(2012) 21 Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 284.  
68 TGEU (n 13).   
 are “fit” to be good parents’.69 Both medical and policy decision-makers have argued that mental 
distress associated with gender identity should automatically disqualify trans persons from becoming 
parents. Indeed, de Sutter el al note that, even within Europe’s trans communities, there are persons 
who ‘believe the psychological trauma they had to go through because of their gender dysphoria would 
impair a normal parent-child relationship’.70  
 
  Finally, across Europe, infertility requirements are imposed as a means of protecting the ‘normative 
nature’ of reproduction. Even if legal men and women can and want to conceive or beget children, there 
are, it is argued, reasons why this should not happen.71 In an important 2011 judgment, the German 
Constitutional Court struck down the sterilisation clause under s. 8 of the Federal Transsexual Act 1980 
(‘the 1980 Act’).72 However, in its published opinion, the Court nevertheless warned that allowing trans 
individuals to procreate (using their natural reproductive organs) after gender recognition ‘contradict[s] 
the concept of the sexes and would have far-reaching consequences for the legal order’.73 In a European 
context, centred around what Fineman calls ‘the sexual family’74 – ‘a heterosexual relationship between 
a man and a woman…romanticized in the glorification of the nuclear family…[which] is central to 
traditional family law ideology’75 – sterilisation requirements reinforce comprehensible, normatively 
desirable procreative standards. Indeed, given that the ‘politics and practices of reproduction have 
                                                          
69 L M Dickey, K M Ducheny and R D Ehrbar, ‘Family Creation Options for Transgender and Gender 
Nonconforming People’ (2016) 3(2) Psychology of Sexual Orientation and Gender Diversity 173, 174.  
70 de Sutter and others (n 58).   
71 Atamer (n 55). Similar arguments have been raised against trans reproduction outside of Europe (e.g. K 
Nelson, ‘The Small Person Acquisition Project’ The Current 2011 at <http://thirdcoastfestival.org/library/982-
the-small-person-acquisition-project> accessed 3 December 2016.)   
72 BvR 3295/07 (n 22).   
73 Ibid.  
74 M A Fineman, ‘The Neutered Mother’ (1992) 46(3) University of Miami Law Review 653, 662-666.  
75 Ibid, 663.  
 historically rested on one key certainty…that only women were the bearers of babies’76, post-transition 
reproductive threatens to invert ‘traditional notions of gender’.77 
 
C. Challenging the Sterilisation Requirement 
 
Europe’s sterilisation requirements have not gone unchallenged. In 2015, the United Nations (UN) High 
Commissioner for Human Rights called upon states to ‘[issue] legal identity documents, upon request, 
that reflect preferred gender…[while] eliminating abusive preconditions, such as sterilization’.78 The 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has recently recommended that State Parties ‘abolish 
sterilisation…as a necessary legal requirement to recognise a person’s gender identity’.79 As noted, 
these soft-law recommendations have now been explicitly endorsed by the ECtHR in AP, Garcon and 
Nicot v France.80 The Court observed that sterilisation requirements place applicants for legal gender 
recognition in an ‘insoluble dilemma’.81 Either trans individuals forfeit their reproductive capabilities, 
and thus sacrifice their bodily integrity, or they refuse medical intervention and forgo their fundamental 
right to be acknowledged in their preferred gender.82 Such an ultimatum confronts applicants with an 
impossible choice, and is not compatible with a state’s positive obligations under Art. 8 ECHR.83  
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   Starting with the 2004 Act, a number of European jurisdictions, including Norway, Denmark, Sweden, 
and Malta have removed infertility clauses from their national gender identity laws.84 As noted, in 2011, 
the German Constitutional Court held that sterilisation was incompatible with the Basic Law right to 
physical integrity.85 In Sweden, the Stockholm Administrative Court of Appeals also invoked physical 
integrity to strike down sterilisation in the original 1972 Act.86 In reasoning closely followed by the 
ECtHR in AP, Garcon and Nicot, the Stockholm court suggested that, where it is an absolute condition 
for obtaining gender recognition, consent to sterilisation cannot be considered as ‘voluntary’.87 In Italy, 
the Constitutional Court held that, in determining the relationship between a person’s preferred and 
assigned genders, ‘the protection of health’ should be the priority.88 While gender confirming surgeries, 
and the removal of natural reproductive organs, may assist some trans persons to achieve better mental 
health, it should not be a pre-condition for legal gender recognition.  
 
  This growing body of case law, and the actions of national policy makers, is an important affirmation 
of Europe’s trans population. Against a background where trans individuals, across the continent, 
experience disproportionate rates of physical violence,89 emphasising bodily integrity rights is a 
symbolic statement that all actors – both state and non-state – should respect trans autonomy. Yet, while 
courts and law makers increasing prohibit the operation of trans sterilisation, they have largely failed to 
                                                          
84 K Knight and N Goshal, ‘Recognizing the Rights of Transgender People’ Human Rights Watch, 13 February 
2016), at < https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/02/13/recognizing-rights-transgender-people> accessed 3 
December 2016; TGEU (n 13); ILGA-Europe, ‘Its Official – France Adopts a New Legal Gender Recognition 
Procedure’ ILGA-Europe website 12 October 2016 at < http://ilga-europe.org/resources/news/latest-
news/france-adopts-new-legal-gender-recognition-procedure > accessed 3 December 2016.  
85 1 BvR 3295/07 (n 22).   
86 NN (n 23).   
87 Ibid.  
88 221/2015 (n 24).     
89 FRA EU (n 29), 10.  
 consider the reasons why such requirements are imposed in the first place. AP, Garcon and Nicot, as 
well as the various national court judgments on sterilisation, clearly assert that enforced infertility is a 
not a proportionate interference with trans private lives. However, the decisions offer little in the way 
of critical reflection on the legitimacy of the aims which that interference purports to pursue. Similar 
patterns are observable in legislative action against infertility requirements. The British parliamentary 
debates on the landmark Gender Recognition Act 2004 reveal considerable concern for the physical 
integrity of trans individuals. Yet, as with their judicial counterparts, the members of Parliament 
demonstrated little evidence that they were engaged with, and seeking to refute, common arguments 
against trans reproduction.90 To the extent that (a) the rationales for infertility reflect historic prejudice 
against trans communities and (b) that they may continue to justify restricting trans rights in other 
contexts, it is increasingly necessary to properly evaluate the legal, scientific and moral arguments on 
which they are based.  
 
 
II. CERTAINTY IN FAMILY LAW 
 
 
A primary justification against procreation post-transition is that legal men giving birth, or legal women 
begetting children, would impermissibly destabilise Europe’s family law systems. When Sweden 
enacted its original gender recognition law in 1972, a core rationale for sterilisation was maintaining 
legal certainty.91 If trans individuals, who have been acknowledged in their preferred gender, can 
nevertheless procreate using their natural reproductive capacities, there is a fear that any resulting 
children will be confused about their genetic origins or denied important family relationships.92 Where 
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 a trans man conceives and gives birth to a child, is he a ‘mother’, ‘parent’ or, if intending to raise the 
child with his female partner, a legal father?  
 
  The need for legal certainty has played, and continues to enjoy, a primary role in shaping European 
responses to trans identities. As recently as 2011, the German federal government, when defending the 
sterilisation requirement in the 1980 Act, relied upon the supposed incompatibility of trans reproduction 
within a family law system based on child-bearing women and sperm-producing men.93 As noted above, 
legal certainty and stability was also the main defence offered by the French government in AP, Garcon 
and Nicot.94 In jurisdictions, such as Ireland, Malta and the United Kingdom, which formally 
acknowledge preferred gender, the law expressly states that gender recognition cannot alter, or erase, 
existing family law obligations.95 An Irish trans woman, who has gained paternal rights through 
providing sperm for conception, cannot lose, or relinquish, her paternal status merely because she has 
been affirmed in her female identity.96 In JK, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, Hickinbottom J, considering whether a trans woman could be re-registered as female, or a 
‘parent’, on her child’s birth certificate, observed that the desires of trans parents have to be balanced 
against ‘the public interest in having coherent administrative systems’.97  
 
  Without doubt, promoting certainty in family law is a legitimate goal. The proper administration of 
family-centred policies would be hampered if state authorities could not identify existing familial 
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 relationships. To the extent that gender recognition rules might obstruct or destabilise a coherent family 
law system, there would be a compelling justification for circumscribing, or appropriately limiting, 
those rules. As noted, UK and Irish law currently removes the possibility that a self-identified male, 
who becomes a child’s legal mother at birth, can subsequently be recognised as a legal father through 
gender recognition – irrespective of the role that he actually plays within the family unit. However, in 
both jurisdictions, this limitation has been largely accepted by trans advocates as necessary to ensure 
there is clarity regarding parental status and obligations.98 In the same way, if it could be shown that 
pregnant men (or women begetting children) impermissibly confuse or undermine national family law 
rules, there could be a legitimate justification for sterilisation (which would have to be considered as 
part of a wider proportionality assessment). Yet, does trans procreation (post-gender recognition) create 
greater uncertainty than is already accepted throughout Europe? If pregnant men are no more confusing 
than heterosexual adoption, or IVF, there is no logic in sterilising only trans people. Indeed, even if 
pregnant men do precipitate increased legal uncertainty, are there less onerous solutions than enforced 
infertility?  
 
  Wierckx et al write that there are significant similarities between trans procreation patterns and the 
way in which Europe’s heterosexual (or homosexual) cisgender populations have children.99 Where a 
trans man gives birth (‘the birth father’), the child has a direct relationship with his or her birth parent. 
Although the child is not raised by a birth ‘mother’, this is similar to cisgender adoption which is 
permitted in all 47 State parties to the European Convention. Unlike in the adoption scenario, however, 
the child of the trans man is actually raised by his or her birth parent, who just happens to have a male 
legal gender. If family law really does emphasise the importance of maintaining biological familial 
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 relationships (a right which has been reinforced by numerous ECtHR judgments100), a birth father 
raising his child may be preferable to childrearing where neither parent has given birth.    
 
  Where a birth father (who subsequently raises the child) also provides the egg for conception, the child 
has a direct relationship with at least one genetic parent. The birth father is a ‘natural parent’ in all three 
senses of Baroness Hale’s (in)famous tripartite definition of that term – genetic, gestational and social 
and psychological.101 The child will have a genetic relationship with both social parents if the trans man 
has procreated with a cisgender male partner, who provides the sperm for conception.102 In such a 
situation, there is no biological difference between trans reproduction and typical procreation between 
heterosexual cisgender couples. In both cases, the child knows the identity of, and is raised by, the two 
individuals who provided all the genetic material for his or her conception. The same is true where a 
trans woman naturally procreates with her cisgender female partner.  
 
  Where, on the other hand, a trans man reproduces with a cisgender female partner, the couple will 
have to use a sperm donor. Once again, however, this is similar to scenarios where heterosexual (or 
lesbian) couples use a sperm donor. Like the typical case of heterosexual sperm donation, there are two 
persons with opposite legal genders, one of whom intends to gestate the child and both of whom intend 
to play formally distinct (i.e. ‘father’ and ‘mother’) roles in the child’s life. The extent to which any 
child knows the sperm donor’s identity will depend upon what information the trans man and his female 
partner disclose, or the extent to which the child has a legal right to access that identity information. 
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 What is clear, however, is that a child’s ability to trace the genetic origins of a sperm donor will not be 
hindered merely because his or her birth parent is trans. Where a trans man and his female partner decide 
not to disclose a sperm donor’s identity, their child will be no less certain about his or her genetic origins 
than the children of heterosexual cisgender couples who make a similar choice.  
 
  In the United Kingdom, it might even be argued that children, who know that their birth parent has a 
trans history and who wish to trace their donor parent, have an advantage over the children of 
heterosexual cisgender couples.103 Under the UK’s human fertility and embryology regime, the progeny 
of sperm donations have a right to access information regarding their donor parent.104 They do not, 
however, have an initial right to be informed that the sperm donation took place. Thus, for the children 
of cisgender heterosexual couples, enjoying their right to obtain information depends on parental 
willingness to reveal third-party participation.105 For children who know that their birth parent is a trans 
male, however, if their other parent is a cisgender female, it is obvious that a sperm donation was 
required. In such circumstances, the children are already on notice about third party intervention, and 
they are better-placed to seek out information when they reach the statutory age threshold.106  
 
  The supposedly unacceptable scenarios which arise from trans procreation, and which justify imposing 
sterilisation requirements, are increasingly permitted for cisgender heterosexual couples across Europe. 
According to T’Sjoen, van Caenegem and Wierckx, ‘[o]ne should look at…situations that are 
similar…[t]he only unique aspect of this group is the gender transition…[a]ll other elements, such as 
same sex parenthood, use of donor gametes, and social stigma, can also be found in other groups of 
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 parents’.107 If European states accept increased uncertainty for cisgender procreation, there is ‘no 
reason to apply other criteria to [trans] individuals’ familial relations’.108 Promoting family 
certainty cannot legitimise sterilisation requirements to the extent that they are exclusively 
directed towards applicants for legal gender recognition.   
 
  One must acknowledge, however, that non-normative reproduction is not universally embraced across 
Europe. The failure to harmonise family law rules throughout the European Union illustrates the 
different, often diametrically opposed, rules which Member States have adopted for regulating 
families.109 While T’Sjoen, van Caenegem and Wierckx are correct that trans procreation mirrors 
increasingly accepted reproductive practices, it is also true (as discussed in Part IV) that, against 
Europe’s prevailing ‘sexual family’ framework, those practices still face strong resistance in many parts 
of the continent. In countries, such as France and Austria, fears over genetic and legal certainty have 
circumscribed the options available to cisgender heterosexual couples.110 To the extent that a 
jurisdiction rejects, or limits, donor insemination and surrogacy for non-trans individuals (and that 
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 rejection does not itself violate the European Convention111), surely that state has a stronger justification 
for also restricting similar forms of trans reproduction?  
 
  In addition, while trans reproduction can be framed, in legal terms, as mirroring the typical 
heterosexual cisgender narrative, the actual biology involved often reflects same-gender parenting. 
During the parliamentary debates on the 2004 Act, Lord Tebbit expressed concern that omitting a 
sterilisation clause would allow family formations where both partners were ‘capable of giving birth to 
children’.112 For Lord Tebbit, such a scenario inevitably gave rise to same-gender relationships.113 
Where a trans man procreates with his cisgender female partner, the child will be raised by two parents 
who, irrespective of legal gender, both have (what are popularly considered to be) ‘female’ sex-
characteristics. On the other hand, if the trans man procreates with a cisgender male partner, the question 
of same-gender biology disappears but the child then has two parents who have the same legal gender. 
While same-gender parenting is now permitted in the United Kingdom,114 and in many other Western 
European states,115 this is still a minority position. Across the Council of Europe, concerns about legal 
status and genetics, reinforced by ethical and moral debates, mean that 32 countries still exclude same-
gender couples from joint adoption, 30 countries do not permit second-parent adoption and lesbian 
couples can only access IVF in 12 countries. While the European Court of Human Rights has applied 
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 strict scrutiny to parenting-restrictions based solely on sexual orientation116, State parties retain a 
significant margin of appreciation. To the extent that trans procreation reproduces – explicitly or 
otherwise – impermissible same-gender parenting norms, many European jurisdictions may argue that 
it transgresses the established boundaries of family formation. Where a jurisdiction legitimately controls 
family structures for cisgender persons, there is a compelling argument that similar considerations can 
be applied to the trans population. However, in the context of trans reproduction, can legal certainty be 
achieved without sterilising applicants for gender recognition?   
 
  In its 2011 decision, the German Constitutional Court observed that ‘it can be ensured by law that the 
children concerned will, in spite of a parent’s legal gender reassignment, always be legally assigned a 
father and a mother’.117 If fears over legal uncertainty are motivating European sterilisation clauses, 
those fears can be addressed through legal, rather than physical, interventions. In Denmark, the 
designation of parental status operates separately from legal gender recognition.118 Danish law does not 
require that trans persons undergo any medical treatment before they access legal recognition.119 A 
person who obtains recognition is treated, for most legal purposes, as having the preferred gender. 
However, where a trans man, who has accessed recognition, gives birth to a child, the Danish Children’s 
Act requires that the individual be designated as the child’s ‘mother’.120 A trans woman, who provides 
sperm for reproduction, will be treated as the child’s father.121 The Danish system offers an alternative 
model for jurisdictions that are concerned about uncertain family structures. Similar rules apply as part 
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 of the Dutch and German Civil Codes122 and, collectively, these jurisdictions demonstrate that it is 
possible to create certainty in parent-child relationships, while avoiding the need to sterilise applicants 
for legal gender recognition.  
 
  One can question, however, whether designating a trans man as his child’s ‘legal mother’, or a trans 
woman as her child’s ‘legal father’, actually encourages, rather than decreases, legal confusion. Where 
a trans man, in a heterosexual relationship, gives birth, he will generally adopt the ‘father’ role. This 
man raises his children in his preferred male gender.123 He interacts with his children as a man, and is 
understood by wider society as being a man. The ‘social reality’, as referred to in the ECtHR case law124, 
for such families is based on the birth parent’s male identity. Under the Danish model, the only 
institution that does not respect and acknowledge the gender of these male birth parents is the law. 
However, as a result, whenever birth fathers, and their children, engage with the law – applying for 
schools, health care etc. – they face a system which is confused, unclear and incapable of catering for 
their specific family needs. Registering trans men as mothers and trans women as father’s risks 
increasing legal uncertainty. It fails to take account of the social reality and does not promote the best 
interests of the child.  
 
III. CHILD WELFARE 
 
A second aim of sterilisation is to protect any future child from the potential dangers of having a trans 
parent, in particular a parent who has played a non-normative role (e.g. woman producing sperm) in the 
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 child’s conception.125 There are well-documented concerns – among medics and policy makers – that 
trans parents expose children to increased harm and that such minors will face risks which are not 
present in cisgender family structures.126 In her 1974 memoir, ‘Conundrum’, charting her journey 
through the transition process, the British author, Jan Morris, cites an overwhelming fear that her 
children ‘might be teased or mocked at school’ because of their parent’s trans status.127 
According to Dierckx et al, ‘[c]hildren with a transgender parent may experience difficulties due to 
transphobia in society’.128 Since the earliest legislative moves towards affirming trans identities, there 
has been a clear emphasis on avoiding ‘possible future discrimination of the child’.129Indeed, in the 
recent English case of J v B and The Children130, Peter Jackson J refused a trans woman direct contact 
with her five children because, on the available evidence, it was clear that contact would result in the 
children being marginalised by their orthodox Jewish community, a result which would not promote 
the welfare of the children.131   
 
  In many respects, concern over discrimination is not without merit. According to the largest EU-wide 
survey of trans experiences, conducted by EU FRA in 2012, 54% of trans respondents did feel 
‘personally discriminated against or harassed because they were perceived as trans’.132 Europe’s trans 
communities (and, by extension, their families) experience higher rates of unequal treatment in 
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 employment, healthcare and accessing goods or services.133 In the specific field of parent-child 
relationships, 24% of survey respondents ‘who attended school/university themselves or [had] a 
child/children in school/at university say they felt personally discriminated against’ [emphasis 
added].134 As J v B illustrates, inequality arising from parental gender identity is not a mere academic 
or hypothetical concern. Describing the lived-experience of trans families in Ireland, Church, O’Shea 
and Lucey observe that, in order to avoid social stigma, ‘children [of trans individuals] would not allow 
their parent to be seen with them in public nor have any contact with their friends’.135 In the Ukraine, 
the desire to avoid child discrimination is so strong that, in addition to prohibiting future procreation, 
the Ministry of Health required that applicants wait until their offspring have reached the age of 
majority.136  
 
  Yet, should the potential for discrimination justify a sterilisation requirement? Anti-trans bias does not 
prove that trans individuals are unfit parents, nor that ‘reproduction in this family setting is ethically 
unacceptable’.137 Discrimination on the basis of gender identity merely proves that a cross-section of 
Europe’s population is prejudiced against trans individuals. If policy makers believe that the children 
of trans parents will experience discrimination, the appropriate response is to address the existence of 
prejudice in society.138 Sharpe writes that ‘disgust and revulsion are emotional responses conditioned 
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 by systemic transphobia…and…should not be viewed as sufficient in meeting a threshold of harm’.139 
Anti-trans attitudes are not a legitimate justification for compromising trans fertility. Any other 
conclusion would mean that, every time law makers (or a section of society) wish to curb minority 
freedoms, they could simply whip up discriminatory sentiments against that group. It certainly would 
not be appropriate to require that biracial couples undergo sterilisation because of lingering ‘anti-
miscegenation’ attitudes. Similarly, it might be interesting to consider, in the context of J v B, whether 
Peter Jackson J would have felt enabled to refuse direct contact had ‘J’ been a gay man rather than a 
trans woman.   
 
  As noted in Section I, child welfare arguments are also framed through the fear that, in addition to 
third-party discrimination, trans parents themselves may cause harm to any offspring. There are doubts 
– expressed by both policy makers and members of the trans community – that a person’s trans history 
renders him or her unfit to undertake the parenting role.  
 
  In PV v Spain, the European Court of Human Rights upheld a Spanish court’s decision to limit a trans 
woman’s contact with her son.140 The ECtHR ruled that the national court had not committed 
discrimination because contact had been restricted pursuant to a mental health assessment. The national 
authority had therefore acted in the best interests of the child.141 However, while it is clear that no parent 
– cisgender or trans – should enjoy childcare responsibilities unless they are emotionally fit for the task 
– it is striking that the Strasbourg judges gave no consideration to the troubling social norms which 
have historically defined the trans-medico relationship.142 The fact is that, whether a European 
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 jurisdiction adheres to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V) or the 
International Classification of Diseases (WHO ICD) 143 – expressing a trans identity is ipso facto 
considered pathological. Even where trans individuals experience no mental distress or emotional 
instability, the mere fact that they are trans is indicative of pathology. While the applicant in PV may 
well have been unfit for regular contact with her son, it is incumbent upon European courts to ensure 
that medical assessments actually reflect the capacity to provide care, and do not simply reproduce 
historic prejudice against trans parenting. It may be instructive that, according to Ferrer Riba and 
Lamarca Marques, following the ECtHR judgment in PV, Spain’s lower courts used the decision to 
justify numerous subsequent restrictions on trans parental rights.144  
 
  The notion that trans individuals are incapable or unstable parents is not supported by the existing 
medical and social scientific evidence. While there is a need for greater research,145 it appears that a 
parent’s trans status ‘does not have a negative influence on the psychosexual or gender identity 
development of…children’.146 De Sutter et al write that ‘studies have shown that most transsexual 
individuals are very well adapting to their post-transition life and are capable of establishing a normal 
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 relationship with children’.147 McGuinness and Alghrani observe that ‘[t]here is no evidence to indicate 
a child’s welfare would be adversely affected by being raised by a parent who has undergone sex 
reassignment surgery’.148 There is no reason to believe that, as a general class, trans persons are any 
less capable of raising children than Europe’s cisgender population.  
 
  For those children who do encounter difficulties with a parent’s transition, the research identifies ‘two 
primary factors’149: the ‘age of the child’ and the ‘absence of a positive relationship between the two 
parents’.150 An adolescent whose parent transitions in an environment of domestic conflict, including 
separation and divorce, may be more adversely affected than a young child whose parent transitions 
with spousal support. Both of these primary factors are less likely to negatively impact upon children 
after legal gender recognition. A trans man, who has obtained recognition, reproduces in circumstances 
where he has already undertaken his transition and where his partner knows his gender identity. There 
is a reduced possibility, therefore, of gender-related strife which would harm a child’s welfare. Where 
the couple decide to procreate, one can assume that the man’s trans status is not an issue for his partner 
(and vice versa for trans women). Similarly, if children benefit from earlier transitions, surely there is 
more likely to be a positive outcome where the parent has already transitioned before birth. As Wierckx 
et al note, in such a situation, ‘the child will not experience the moment of transition and the 
accompanied emotional and social difﬁculties’.151  
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   In relation to concerns regarding mental illness, it is important to note that some trans persons only 
ever approach healthcare services as a box-ticking exercise.152 They obtain a diagnosis of gender 
dysphoria or gender identity disorder because, in 36 states across the Council of Europe, it is a 
requirement for legal gender recognition.153 In reality, trans individuals may not experience a level of 
mental distress which should disqualify them from becoming parents.154 They are happy, well-adjusted 
individuals, who simply want a legal status which reflects their true selves. Much of the distress which 
trans communities experience has no inherent link with gender identity. It is the product of a culture 
which stigmatises and shames gender diversity.155 Laws which undermine and deny the capabilities of 
trans parents encourage, and reproduce, such a culture. It seems particularly unreasonable to require 
that applicants for recognition obtain a diagnosis, irrespective of necessity, and then use that diagnosis 
to limit their family rights.  
 
  Even where trans persons do experience distress because of their gender identity, there is still little 
justification for absolutely prohibiting trans reproduction. As a general rule, psychological or 
psychiatric difficulties do not entitle state officials to sterilise individuals. Where trans persons with 
mental health concerns do have children, social services may subject that family structure to increased 
surveillance. However, just as in the cisgender population, an applicant for recognition’s mental health 
can only justify sterilisation in the rarest of cases.  
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   Trans parenthood, and its effects on children, is undoubtedly still an emerging area for research. Von 
Doussa, Power and Rigg speak of ‘only a handful of studies’ existing on the topic.156 In such 
circumstances, it is perhaps unsurprising that Europe’s policy makers would proceed with caution. As 
with the legal recognition of trans minors, the first, and foremost, consideration must be the wellbeing 
and best interests of any affected children. However, although quantitatively restricted, all existing data, 
since the 1970s, has indicated that young people are not adversely impacted by trans parenthood. James-
Abra et al can cite ‘no empirical evidence demonstrating that the well-being of the children of trans 
people is compromised’.157 They conclude that there is ‘no justiﬁcation for excluding trans people from 
[parenting]’.158 While it is perhaps premature to adopt a definitive position, the existing research does 
favour setting ‘the presumption in favour of transgender men and women’ having a right to 
procreate.159  
 
IV. PRESERVING NATURAL REPRODUCTION 
 
The first two objections can, to a certain extent, be viewed as quasi-empirical enquiries: Does trans 
procreation reduce certainty in family law? Does trans parenting compromise the welfare of children? 
Although reaching a definitive conclusion on both these questions may be difficult (even impossible), 
the effect of trans reproduction on both the legal system and children’s wellbeing is (at least facially) 
subject to measurement. The final justification for sterilisation, however, relates less to what the 
tangible impacts of trans procreation are, and focuses more on normative arguments about how proper 
reproduction, and the creation of new life, ought to be. Sterilisation requirements are promoted as a 
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 means of preserving the supposedly ‘natural’ and proper link between child birth and legal women.160 
Writing about shifting attitudes towards trans individuals in Eastern Europe, Havelkova describes the 
imposition of an ‘operative solution’ – which would remove a trans man’s uterus and a trans woman’s 
testes – in order to ‘cure and normalise’ trans individuals, avoiding the possibility of future non-
normative reproduction.161 If individuals, who are formally recognised as male by society, retain the 
capacity to conceive children, gender recognition will become a vehicle for inverting the natural 
order.162  
 
  This argument relies upon an understanding – long evident in European debates on trans rights – that 
physical sex characteristics determine legal gender.163 In perhaps Europe’s most famous trans rights 
litigation, Corbett v Corbett (Otherwise Ashley), Ormrod J ruled that April Ashely could not be a legal 
female for the purposes of English marriage law because she lacked the ‘biological’ attributes which 
are ‘essential’ for the ‘role of a woman in marriage’.164 Every human being, so the argument goes, is 
born with unambiguously male or female body traits (e.g. breasts for women, testes for men, etc.) and 
these physical traits determine whether a person is male or female, including whether they have a male 
legal gender or a female legal gender.165 If sex determines gender, and pregnancy is a female 
characteristic, all persons who can become pregnant must be assigned the ‘female’ status. Writing in 
2016, Kassam observes that, despite changing attitudes and practices in modern parenting, there is still 
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 a persisting belief that ‘[i]f you’re giving birth, you’re a mother’.166 Sterilisation requirements reinforce 
and legitimise Europe’s orthodox reproductive binary.  
 
  There are many reasons why it is troubling to define gender identity through the lens of a supposedly 
natural or universal notion of human reproduction. When the German Constitutional Court speaks of 
an established ‘concept of the sexes’,167 which pregnant men or begetting women would destabilise, to 
what exactly are the judges referring? It is clear that, across Europe, many individuals are not born with 
unambiguously male or female body traits.168 Persons who exhibit intersex variance169 challenge the 
idea of rigid, natural male-female binary, and their experiences are increasingly being accommodated 
through possibilities for not registering an infant’s gender (e.g. Germany170, Malta171).  
 
  However, perhaps more important for present purposes, the idea that sex characteristics – including 
the ability to conceive children or to produce sperm – determines legal gender is highly contestable. If 
sex defines legal gender, surely this undermines, or even negates, the right to legal gender recognition? 
Commenting on the status of trans persons under the European Convention, Gonzalez-Salzberg notes 
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 that ‘understanding…sex as biological also means that it is immutable’.172 While, in Corbett, Ormrod J 
may have too readily dismissed the consequences of gender confirming healthcare, the judge was 
correct that, according to current scientific knowledge, persons who undertake a medical transition do 
not obtain all the physical traits (e.g. chromosomes) associated with their preferred gender.173 A trans 
man who seeks to legally affirm his male gender will never be able to produce sperm for procreation. 
Similarly, despite recent movements towards uterus implantation,174 there is currently no way for trans 
women to conceive and bear children. Sex-as-gender (in particular, sexed-reproductive-capacities-as-
gender) is a biological destination to which surgery and hormones cannot fully transport applicants for 
gender recognition. Instead, in affirming a right to recognition, the 41 European jurisdictions must 
accept that biology is only one factor contributing to legal gender.  
 
  Rosario speaks of gender as ‘a biological, psychological and cultural phenomenon’.175 Along with 
biological traits, such as pregnancy, additional considerations, including self-identification, gender 
expression and social perception, all influence a person’s gender.176 The question is what relative weight 
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 the various factors should be afforded. Even if the ability to conceive a child is not wholly determinative 
of legal womanhood, surely sterilisation can be justified if biology remains the dominant influence? 
However, are physical characteristics, such as testes and a uterus, really the essential elements of male 
and female gender in Europe? It is arguable that – rather than following biology – gender is primarily 
formed through expression, attribution and the conscious (or subconscious) adoption of gendered 
roles.177 According to Vade, ‘[g]ender is one’s own specific way of interacting with and presenting 
oneself to the world’.178 Post-structuralists, most notably Butler179, have characterised gender as a 
‘discursive construct, something that is produced, and not a “natural fact”’.180 Whatever definition or 
conceptualisation one ultimately adopts, the fact remains that human beings interact with each other 
daily on the basis of ‘a small number of visual cues and a ton of assumption’.181 As Green points out, 
in almost no circumstances do individuals stop to confirm whether their assumptions actually accord 
with biology.182  
 
  Against this background, and when subject to proper critique, the ‘natural’ link between biological 
characteristics, such as the capacity to bear or beget children, and legal gender is tenuous. Using biology 
to determine status cannot be administered in a rational, principled manner. It is unclear what physical 
traits are so essential that their presence or absence can define legal gender. The law in the Ukraine 
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 requires removal of internal reproductive organs while, in the Czech Republic, those organs need only 
be permanently disabled. In Spain, applicants for gender recognition need undergo neither surgery nor 
sterilisation, but there must be the development of secondary sex characteristics183, usually by way of 
hormone therapy.184 Is it more important that a woman have her prostate and testes removed rather than 
simply disabled? Why is it more important that men have facial hair, or masculine body fat distribution 
(the consequence of cross-sex hormones) than proving the absence of their uterus? In Western Europe, 
neighbouring jurisdictions, such as Belgium (e.g. sterilisation) and the Netherlands (e.g. no physical 
interventions),185 which share strong cultural links, have adopted radically different views about the 
essentiality of sex characteristics, and the relationship between reproduction and legal gender. 
According to Tomchin, such ‘differing interpretations demonstrate that there is no consensus on which 
body parts are necessary for someone to be considered a man or a woman’.186  
 
  There is no doubt that only persons who have a uterus can conceive children.187 As noted, trans women 
who undergo full genital reconstructive surgery still cannot conceive or bear children because they 
cannot (at present) obtain a fully functioning uterus. However, does conceding that nature limits 
childbirth to persons with a uterus mean that only legal women can give birth (and that people who 
conceive children cannot be legal men)? The latter statement pre-supposes that all individuals with a 
uterus are naturally legal women. However, the link between a uterus and the female legal gender is a 
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 consequence of law, not nature.188 According to Ryan, ‘the concept of pregnancy as feminine is only a 
social mandate and not a biological reality’.189 There is no ‘natural’ rule that persons with a uterus 
automatically must be legal women, or that legal women must automatically have a uterus.190 Indeed, 
as the facts of Z v A Government Department and the Board of Management of a Community School191 
illustrate, some legal women in Europe may be born without a functioning uterus or, in rare cases, with 
no uterus at all. Rather, the law makes a policy choice to assign all persons with a uterus to the female 
legal gender.  
 
  When analysing Europe’s sterilisation requirements, there is a sense that opposition to male pregnancy 
is less about ‘nature’ and more about societal attitudes towards proper reproduction. Fausto-Sterling 
suggests that discomfort with trans bodies reflects the challenge that they pose to accepted ‘gender 
divisions’: ‘we must control those bodies which are so unruly as to blur the borders’.192 In a European 
framework, which remains tightly anchored to Fineman’s ‘sexual family’ model, procreation which 
threatens that model is a source of significant social anxiety. To the extent that individuals deviate from 
a binary ‘woman/mother/conception – man/father/begetter’ schema, their reproductive possibilities are 
circumscribed by traditional procreative conventions. According to Weismann, the existing rules of 
‘repronormativity’ have a particularly detrimental impact on lesbian, gay, bisexual and trans (‘LGBT’) 
                                                          
188 Ibid. See also Emens (n 54), 229.  
189 M. Ryan, ‘The Gender of Pregnancy: Masculine Lesbians Talk about Reproduction’ (2013) 17(2) Journal of 
Lesbian Studies 119, 125.  
190 VM Gutierrez and BE Hernindez-Truyol comments in D Rosenblum and others, ‘Pregnant Man? A 
Conversation’ (2010) 22 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 207, 231.  
191 Case 362/12 [2014] 3 CMLR 20, at [35]. 
192 A Fausto-Sterling, Sexing the Body: Gender Politics and the Construction of Sexuality (New York: Basic 
Books, 2008), 8.  
 persons.193 As these individuals necessarily engage in a-typical procreation, they automatically 
destabilise the sexual family model and are more vulnerable to social censure. There is evidence that, 
while same-gender relationships are increasingly accepted across the European Union, same-gender 
parents continue to encounter substantial opposition.194 It may be that, while the law should not interfere 
with private conduct, society is more willing to set minimum standards for reproductive conduct. 
McCandless and Sheldon place trans procreation within this wider context of cultural anxiety over queer 
parenting.195 Trans individuals face limitations in their procreative choices not because they violate any 
natural link between normative reproduction and legal gender. On the contrary, they are sterilised 
precisely because trans procreation reveals that no such link exists and exposes the ‘tensions inherent 
in continuing to map our legal determinations of parenthood to a family model that is unmoored from 
its traditional underpinnings’.196  
 
  In such circumstances, rather than fearing the unnaturalness or abnormality of trans reproduction, one 
should embrace and celebrate the transformative, possibly emancipatory, potential of trans procreation. 
Until the emergence of Europe’s intersex rights movement in the mid-1990s,197 doctors would routinely 
assign new born infants to the male legal gender if the baby exhibited an ‘adequate’ penis (‘one that is 
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 [capable] of penetrating a female’s vagina’198). A child was assigned to a female legal gender if there 
was evidence of female ‘reproductive capability’. These interventions, which are still carried out across 
Europe,199 reflect and reproduce widely entrenched notions about the proper status of men and women. 
According to Greenberg, ‘men are defined based upon their ability to penetrate females and females are 
defined based upon their ability to procreate’.200 Law and medicine collude to construct a dominant 
male identity, which exercises its power by penetrating women who are themselves only valued for 
their role as mother and child bearer. However, what shifts would occur in this gender disequilibrium 
if legal women had the capacity to impregnate men? In a Europe where both legal men and legal women 
give birth, can only women be viewed through the lens of motherhood? Would the idea of 
‘motherhood’, with all its social connotations, even exist? For many people, it is because trans 
reproduction potentially emancipates women from sex-based stereotyping that such procreation creates 
unease.201 Boyd writes that ‘[o]ur narrow definitions of gender roles may be broadening, but our visceral 
response to the blurring of those roles is still one of shock or confusion’.202  
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   Of course, given the changing nature of trans reproduction, and the extent to which trans fertility has 
only become a core medical and legal concern in the past decade, it would be premature to exclude any 
possibility that challenging gendered-assumptions could have future, unintended consequences. For 
European lawyers, one obvious area of concern – which has not yet been raised in national sterilisation 
debates – is the potential impact of pregnant men on the European Union’s pregnancy non-
discrimination rules. In Dekker v Stichting Vormingscentrum voor Jong Volwassenen (VJV- Centrum) 
Plus,203 the European Court of Justice held that a woman who experiences unfavourable employment 
treatment because of pregnancy can claim sex discrimination.204 The woman is entitled to bring her 
action irrespective of whether she can prove that a comparably placed male individual was treated 
better. The rationale for adopting this sui generis non-comparator model is clear: pregnancy is 
exclusively experienced by women; pregnancy discrimination arises against women because of a 
gendered characteristic which men do not share; it is therefore inappropriate to compare the situation 
of a pregnant woman with a non-pregnant man. A similar conclusion was reached by the Supreme Court 
of Canada in Brooks v Safeway Canada Ltd205 and by the United States Congress as part of the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act 1978. 
 
  Where both legal women and legal men can become pregnant, is it tenable to maintain a discrimination 
test which focuses solely on womanhood? Given the long history of sterilisation requirements across 
Europe, it is unsurprising that national courts have yet to specifically rule on the position of pregnant 
men in employment discrimination cases. Within wider social commentary, however, there are 
undoubtedly strong feminist objections to ‘decentering “women”206 from’ political and legal debates 
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 over reproductive justice.207 As reproductive service providers increasingly neutralise their gendered-
language to accommodate non-female pregnant individuals, there is a fear that – both symbolically and 
substantively – women’s identities are being erased. Scholars and commentators point to the fact that, 
whether or not legal men can conceive children, pregnancy is a biological (and social) phenomenon 
which overwhelmingly affects female-identified lives, and which remains a primary obstacle to 
women’s professional advancement.208 Strangio writes that the ‘idea of shifting from talking about 
“pregnant women” to “pregnant people” can evoke traumatic memories of the [American] Supreme 
Court's refusal to protect pregnant people from discrimination under a sex discrimination theory’.209 In 
Geduldig v. Aiello, the all-male Court, framing pregnancy in gender-neutral terms, denied the plaintiff 
relief under Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act 1964 on the basis that she had been discriminated 
against as a pregnant person (which was not a protected characteristic) rather than as a woman.210 
Similarly, in Europe, if persons who are acknowledged to be men can conceive children, it may be more 
difficult for the law to emphasise the gendered dynamics of pregnancy.  
 
  For some scholars, however, the requirement to redefine pregnancy in non-gendered terms represents 
an opportunity rather than a detriment. Authors, such as Rosenblum, have longed advocated a process 
of ‘unsexing’ reproduction,211 which would more accurately reflect the multiple roles which individuals 
play in procreation and child-rearing. For Karaian, to the extent that Europe’s current pregnancy 
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 protections are incapable of embracing trans masculine and non-binary identities, there is justification 
for ‘reconceiving of pregnancy as a ground of discrimination divorced from sex’.212 Indeed, for 
Williams, de-gendering pregnancy may potentially enhance the social position of women. She questions 
how women benefit from rules which reinforce and mandate their ‘special place in the scheme of human 
existence when it comes to maternity’.213 How these arguments would play out in practice remains open 
to doubt. While a utopian vista of unsexed reproduction may have intuitive appeal, it is unclear how a 
gender-neutral law would have appeared to Mrs Dekker when she was being refused employment 
because of a physical trait which no male applicant would have faced.  
 
  At a practical level, one can argue that, considering the small number (if any) of legal males who will 
ever claim pregnancy discrimination, EU member states can still properly maintain a gender-equality 
model, while also providing exceptional relief to male petitioners. The fact that trans men can become 
pregnant does not lessen the gendered ways in which many women experience pregnancy 
discrimination. Indeed, where pregnant men are themselves treated inferior, their experience, even as 
men, will be informed by the same patriarchal norms which devalue pregnancy because of its 
association with women. Recognising that a small number of trans men become pregnant does not 
detract from the gendered context in which pregnancy discrimination arises.   
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 CONCLUSION 
 
In July 2016, Britain’s Daily Telegraph newspaper published a headline warning ‘[s]ex change men 
“on brink” of having babies following NHS treatment’.214 The notion of trans procreation has 
profoundly impacted European attitudes towards gender identity and continues to shape national rules 
for recognising preferred gender. Across the Council of Europe, trans individuals in 22 countries must 
prove their infertility before obtaining gender recognition. According to Veale et al, the ‘loss of fertility 
resulting from hormone blockers, hormones, and surgeries [is] considered the “price to pay” for 
transition’.215 Trans persons, who seek to live a fully-actualised life in their affirmed gender, must forgo 
reproduction to achieve that goal.  
 
  Europe’s judges and policymakers are increasingly challenging trans sterilisation. The Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe, national courts and, most recently, the ECtHR have all condemned 
infertility clauses as a disproportionate breach of European rights norms. Yet, while these actions 
represent progress, they largely fail to confront the baseline rationales which motivate sterilising 
applicants for gender recognition. Judges may be willing to rule that mandatory infertility is not a 
proportionate breach of the European Convention but they have been less quick to confront the 
legitimacy of sterilisation. In some ways, this may simply reflect traditional European methods of legal 
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 analysis. Judges, who ultimately strike down sterilisation requirements as disproportionate, may prefer 
deference to elected legislatures in identifying legitimate policy goals. Yet, the rationales for 
sterilisation have influence far beyond the gender recognition context. Questions over trans mental 
health might be insufficient to warrant sterilisation, but they can be decisive in deciding parental rights 
over children. The Daily Telegraph’s headline illustrates that, while arguments about bodily integrity 
were sufficient to affirm trans procreative rights under the 2004 Act, they have not quelled the social 
opprobrium attaching to the actual exercise of those rights.  
 
  This article has directly challenged the European justifications for sterilisation as a precondition for 
legal gender recognition. Critiquing assumptions about legal certainty, child welfare and natural 
reproduction, the article concludes that sterilisation requirements rely upon a weak, discriminatory and 
logically-inconsistent framework. Pregnant men and begetting women are certainly uncommon. They 
fit into neither the sexual family model nor general cultural understandings about normative 
reproduction. Yet, neither group represent a threat to society and the families that they raise. European 
policy makers have failed to offer a compelling rationale for trans sterilisation and such requirements 
should not form part of Europe’s gender recognition rules.  
